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Abstract
In this article we study supermodular functions on finite distributive lattices.
Relaxing the assumption that the domain is a powerset of a finite set, we
focus on geometrical properties of the polyhedral cone of such functions.
Specifically, we generalize the criterion for extremality and study the face
lattice of the supermodular cone. An explicit description of facets by the
corresponding tight linear inequalities is provided.
Keywords: supermodular/submodular function, core, coalitional game,
polyhedral cone
1. Introduction
Supermodular functions, and their duals, submodular functions, play
a central roˆle in many fields of discrete mathematics, most notably combina-
torial optimization (rank function of polymatroids: see, e.g., the monograph
of Fujishige [7]), game theory (characteristic function of transferable util-
ity games: see, e.g., Peleg and Sudho¨lter [13]), decision theory (capacity,
Choquet expected utility [17]), lattice theory, etc.
Up to duality, all above examples fall into the category of supermodular
games, that is, supermodular functions vanishing at the empty set. They
form a polyhedral cone, whose facets have been found by Kuipers et al. [12].
In his 1971 seminal paper, Shapley [18] gave the 37 extreme supermodular
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games for n = 4 players, and noted that for larger values of n, little can be
said. Later, Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [16] found all extreme supermodular
functions by representing each such function as a maximum over shifted
additive games. Recently, Studeny´ and Kroupa [20] revisited the problem
and provided another characterization of extremality, in a sense dual to the
result of Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner, but easier to use.
The aim of this paper is to (re)establish in a more general framework
and in a simpler way the above results (together with new ones) describ-
ing the cone of supermodular games, taking advantage of classical results
on polyhedra. We consider games defined on a finite distributive lattice L,
generated by a partial order  on the set of players N . The poset induces
some relation between the players, which can be interpreted in various ways:
precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern [5]), hierarchy (Grabisch and Xie
[10]), or permission structure (van den Brink and Gilles [4]). Feasible coali-
tions of players, i.e., those for which the game is defined, are down-sets on
(N,), and they form a distributive lattice L. By Birkhoff’s theorem, every
finite distributive lattice is of this form. The standard case L = 2N is recov-
ered when the poset (N,) is flat, i.e., when all players are incomparable
(no order relation between the players).
A large amount of research has been done concerning games on distribu-
tive lattices, as well as on other ordered structures (see a survey in [8]). Most
of them are related to the solution concepts such as Shapley value or the
core. However, up to our knowledge, there is no systematic study on the
geometric properties of the cone of supermodular games defined on distribu-
tive lattices. Note that it is very natural to take a distributive lattice as a
domain of a supermodular function since supermodular inequalities involve
only the lattice joins and meets. The present paper addresses precisely this
point. In the same time we generalize and prove results about extreme rays
and facets in a more concise way.
Section 2 collects background on distributive lattices. Coalitional games
are introduced in Section 3, in particular 0-normalized and supermodular
games. Section 4 contains basic facts about 0-normalized supermodular
games and the cone thereof. The extreme rays are characterized in Section 5.
Basically, a supermodular game generates an extreme ray if and only if a
certain system of linear equalities has for a solution those vectors which are
proportional to the marginal vectors of the game. Section 6 describes the
facial structure of the cone by a certain collection of finite lattices, namely
the tight sets associated with compatible permutations of the poset (N,).
The facets of the cone of supermodular games are characterized in Section 7.
2
2. Finite distributive lattices
In this section we introduce basic notions and results about Birkhoff
duality between finite distributive lattices and finite posets. The reader is
referred to [19, Chapter 3] for all the unexplained notions concerning lattices
and partially ordered sets (posets).
Let L be a finite distributive lattice whose join and meet are denoted
by ∨ and ∧, respectively. A partial order 6 on L is defined by a 6 b if
a ∨ b = b, for all a, b ∈ L. Since L is finite there exists a top element ⊤
and a bottom element ⊥ in L. We always assume that L is non-trivial in
sense that ⊤ 6= ⊥. An element a ∈ L is called join-irreducible if a 6= ⊥ and
the identity a = b ∨ c holding for some b, c ∈ L implies a = b or a = c. In
particular, a ∈ L with a 6= ⊥ is an atom if the condition b 6 a for all b ∈ L
implies b = ⊥ or b = a. The join-irreducible elements of a Boolean lattice
are precisely its atoms. For any a, b ∈ L such that a 6 b, we define an order
interval
[a, b] := {c ∈ L | a 6 c 6 b}.
An element a ∈ L is join-irreducible if, and only if, there is a unique a− ∈ L
such that a− 6 a, a− 6= a, and [a−, a] = {a−, a}. The set of all join-
irreducible elements of L is denoted by J (L) and it is always endowed
with the partial order 6 of L restricted to J (L). Thus, (J (L),6) becomes
a nonempty finite poset.
Let N 6= ∅ be a finite set and  be a partial order on N . A down-set in
(N,) is a subset A ⊆ N such that if i ∈ A and j  i for j ∈ N , then j ∈ A.
For any i ∈ N , we denote
↓ i := {j ∈ N | j  i} and ⇓ i := ↓ i \ {i}.
Both ↓ i and ⇓ i are down-sets in (N,). A down-set A is called principal
if there exists some i ∈ N such that A = ↓ i. By D(N,) we denote the
set of all down-sets in (N,). It is easy to see that D(N,) is closed under
the set-theoretic union ∪ and intersection ∩. Thus, D(N,) is a finite
distributive lattice whose order is the inclusion ⊆ between sets, and whose
top and bottom element is N and ∅, respectively. The lattice D(N,) is the
most general example of a finite distributive lattice by the following classical
result.
Birkhoff’s representation theorem. Let L be a finite distributive lattice.
Then the mapping
FL : L → D(J (L),6)
defined by FL(a) := {b ∈ J (L) | b 6 a} is a lattice isomorphism.
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{2} {3} {4}
{2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {2, 3, 4}
N
Figure 2.1: The poset (N,) with the corresponding lattice of down-sets D(N,)
The converse part of duality explains what are join-irreducible elements in
the lattice of down-sets D(N,).
Proposition 2.1. Let (N,) be a finite poset. Then the mapping
↓ : (N,)→ J (D(N,))
sending every i ∈ N to the principal down-set ↓ i is an order isomorphism.
Example 2.1. Let N := {1, 2, 3, 4} be equipped with the partial order 
captured by the Hasse diagram in Figure 2.1 on the left. On the right-
hand side we depict the lattice of down-sets D(N,). There are four join-
irreducible elements in D(N,), namely {2}, {3}, {4}, and {1, 2, 3}.
3. Coalitional games on finite distributive lattices
We use the standard terminology of cooperative game theory; see [13].
The player set is defined to be N := {1, . . . , n}, for some integer n ≥ 1.
Any subset of N is called a coalition. We allow for a situation in which
players i, j ∈ N are compared using a partial order  on N . Hence, (N,)
is assumed to be a finite poset. Birkhoff duality (see Section 2) entails
that the partial order  on N restricts the formation of coalitions A ⊆ N ,
provided that the coalition structure is modeled by the lattice of down-sets
in (N,).
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Convention. Throughout the paper we will always assume that the set of
all possible coalitions in (N,) is the lattice of down-sets D(N,). We use
the abbreviations
L := D(N,) and J := J (D(N,)).
From now on, all possible coalitions are assumed to be precisely the sets
belonging to a fixed lattice L and J denotes its subset of all join-irreducible
elements. Coalitional games are modeled as real functions v on the set L
of feasible coalitions A, where the real value v(A) indicate the amount of
utility resulting from the joint cooperation of players in the coalition A.
Definition 3.1. A function v : L → R satisfying v(∅) = 0 is a (coalitional)
game. A game v is called
• supermodular if v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B),
• modular if v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) = v(A) + v(B),
• monotone if v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B,
• nonnegative if v(A) ≥ 0,
for all A,B ∈ L.
Let G(L) be the set of all games on L. We consider these subsets of G(L):
GS(L) := {v ∈ G(L) | v is supermodular},
GM (L) := {v ∈ G(L) | v is modular}.
A modular game is also called a valuation (over R) in literature; see [2, 19].
Note that G(L) is a real vector space isomorphic to RL\{∅} and therefore
dimG(L) = |L| − 1. One of the bases in G(L) is found very easily. For each
nonempty A ∈ L, the unanimity game uA is defined by
uA(B) :=
{
1 A ⊆ B,
0 otherwise,
for all B ∈ L.
Then {uA | ∅ 6= A ∈ L} forms a basis in G(L). The coordinates of any
game v ∈ G(L) with respect to this basis are calculated using the Mo¨bius
inversion formula [14]. Specifically, the Mo¨bius function of L is the function
µL : L
2 → R given recursively as
µL(X,Y ) :=


1 X = Y,
−
∑
X⊆Z⊂Y
µL(X,Z) X ⊂ Y,
0 otherwise,
for all X,Y ∈ L.
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The Mo¨bius transform of v ∈ G(L) is the game vˆ ∈ G(L) defined by
vˆ(B) :=
∑
C⊆B
v(C) · µL(C,B), B ∈ L.
Lemma 3.1. For any v ∈ G(L), we have
vˆ(B) =
∑
C⊆B
v(C) · (−1)|B\C|, B ∈ L,
where the sum above is over all C ∈ L such that [C,B] is a Boolean sublattice
of L.
Proof. It suffices to apply the observation from [19, Example 3.9.6]. Specif-
ically, since the lattice L is finite and distributive, the formula for Mo¨bius
function µL simplifies as
µL(X,Y ) =
{
(−1)|Y \X| if [X,Y ] is a Boolean lattice,
0 otherwise,
for every X,Y ∈ L with X ⊆ Y .
Thus, any v ∈ G(L) can be expressed as a linear combination v =∑
∅6=A∈L vˆ(A) · uA, which gives
v(A) =
∑
B⊆A
vˆ(B), A ∈ L. (3.1)
The set of valuations (modular games) GM (L) is a vector subspace of G(L).
By Rota’s lemma [15] any valuation on L is uniquely determined by its
restriction to the set of join-irreducible elements J . It follows that the
dimension of linear space GM (L) equals |J | = n. This means that the
polyhedral cone of supermodular games GS(L) is not pointed as it includes
the non-trivial linear space GM (L). However, we can always consider the
elements of GS(L) modulo GM (L). To this end we introduce the following
notion.
Definition 3.2. A game v ∈ G(L) is said to be 0-normalized if
vˆ(A) = 0, for all A ∈ J .
Let G⋆(L) be the set of all 0-normalized games on L.
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Note that the notion of 0-normalized game on a distributive lattice L
coincides with the usual concept of 0-normalized game in cooperative game
theory (see [13, Definition 2.1.13]). Indeed, when L is the Boolean lattice
2N of all subsets of N , then the only join-irreducible elements in 2N are
exactly the atoms in 2N , that is, J = {{i} | i ∈ N}. If v is 0-normalized in
sense of Definition 3.2, from (3.1) we get v({i}) = vˆ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
which is exactly the definition of 0-normalized coalitional game on 2N .
Lemma 3.2. A game v ∈ G(L) is 0-normalized if and only if v(A) = v(A−)
for all A ∈ J , where A− is the unique element covered by A.
Proof. Let A ∈ J . Then, for any B ∈ L with B ⊆ A, the order interval
[B,A] is a Boolean sublattice of L if, and only if, either B = A or B = A−.
Hence, Lemma 3.1 yields vˆ(A) = v(A)− v(A−).
For any v ∈ G(L), put
v⋆ := v −
∑
B∈J
vˆ(B) · uB.
It is easy to see that G⋆(L) = {v⋆ | v ∈ G(L)}. We claim that, for any
v ∈ G(L), there exist uniquely determined w ∈ G⋆(L) and m ∈ GM (L) such
that
v = w +m. (3.2)
Indeed, it suffices to define w := v⋆, m :=
∑
B∈J vˆ(B) ·uB , and observe that
m ∈ GM (L). Let
G⋆S(L) := GS(L) ∩G
⋆(L).
Then G⋆S(L) = {v
⋆ | v ∈ GS(L)} and Lemma 3.2 says that G
⋆
S(L) contains
exactly those supermodular games satisfying v(A) = v(A−), for all A ∈ J .
Moreover, the convex cone G⋆S(L) is pointed and polyhedral.
Lemma 3.3. Every game v ∈ G⋆S(L) is monotone and nonnegative.
Proof. Since a monotone game is necessarily nonnegative, it suffices to check
monotonicity. We only need to prove that for all A,B ∈ L satisfying B ⊆ A
and |B| = |A| − 1, the inequality v(B) ≤ v(A) holds. Since both A and B
are down-sets in (N,), any such B is necessarily of the form B = A \ {i},
where i is a maximal element of A in (N,). Note that ↓ i ⊆ A and B∩↓ i =
(A \ {i}) ∩ ↓ i = ⇓ i. Then supermodularity yields
v(A) = v(B ∪ ↓ i) ≥ v(B) + v(↓ i)− v(⇓ i).
Since v is 0-normalized and ↓ i ∈ J , Lemma 3.2 implies v(↓ i) − v(⇓ i) =
0.
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By the decomposition (3.2) we can now write GS(L) as the direct sum
of cones,
GS(L) = G
⋆
S(L)⊕GM (L). (3.3)
Specifically, the identity (3.3) means that GS(L) = G
⋆
S(L) + GM (L) and
G⋆S(L) ∩ GM (L) = {0}. Since G
⋆
S(L) is a pointed polyhedral cone, it is
generated by its finitely-many extreme rays.
In the next section we present a simple linear-algebraic criterion to test if
a given 0-normalized supermodular game generates an extreme ray of G⋆S(L).
Our result automatically yields a criterion for extremality of games in GS(L):
we say that a supermodular game v ∈ GS(L) is extreme if v
⋆ generates
an extreme ray of G⋆S(L). Equivalently, v ∈ GS(L) is extreme if, and only if,
the smallest face of GS(L) to which v belongs is an atom of the face lattice
of GS(L). Indeed, faces of GS(L) are in one-to-one correspondence with
faces of G⋆S(L) by the relation F = F
⋆+GM (L), where F is a face of GS(L)
and F ⋆ a face of G∗(L).
4. The cone of supermodular games
A payoff vector is any vector x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n . We define
x(A) :=
∑
i∈A
xi, for any A ∈ L,
and we always assume x(∅) := 0. The core of v ∈ G(L) is a convex polyhe-
dron
C(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), x(A) ≥ v(A) for each A ∈ L}.
The elements of the core C(v) have the standard game-theoretic interpre-
tation. Namely, no payoff vector x ∈ C(v) can be improved upon by any
coalition A ∈ L. In contrast with cores of games over Boolean lattices, the
core of games over distributive lattices can be an unbounded polyhedron.
In fact, assume C(v) 6= ∅, where v ∈ G(L). Then C(v) is bounded if and
only if L is a Boolean lattice; see [9, Chapter 3.3.3]. If v ∈ GS(L), then the
polyhedron C(v) is pointed and its extreme points ext C(v) are characterized
in Theorem 4.1 below.
Recall that we always assume that N is partially ordered by . In
addition we also equip N with the total order of natural numbers ≤, so that
(N,≤) becomes a chain. We say that a permutation pi of N is compatible
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with (N,) if pi−1 is an order-preserving map from (N,) onto (N,≤). Here,
the intended reading is that i is a rank of player pi(i). Define
Π := {pi | pi is a permutation compatible with (N,)} .
Compatible permutations are in bijection with maximal chains in L. Put
Aπ0 := ∅ and A
π
i := {pi(1), . . . , pi(i)} for each i ∈ N . Then, with each pi ∈ Π
we associate a maximal chain Cπ := {Aπi | i ∈ N ∪{0}}. Conversely, starting
from a maximal chain {A0, . . . , An} in L, where A0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ An, there is
clearly a unique pi ∈ Π such that Ai = A
π
i for each i ∈ N ∪ {0}.
A marginal vector of v ∈ G(L) and pi ∈ Π is the vector x
v,π ∈ Rn whose
coordinates are defined as
x
v,π
π(i)
:= v(Aπi )− v(A
π
i−1), i ∈ N. (4.1)
It follows directly from the definition of marginal vector that
v(Aπi ) = x
v,π(Aπi ), for all pi ∈ Π and all i ∈ N ∪ {0}. (4.2)
We will make an ample use of the following identity derived from (4.2):
v(A) = xv,π(A), for all pi ∈ Π and all A ∈ C
π. (4.3)
For any v ∈ G(L) and pi ∈ Π we define
T π(v) := {A ∈ L | v(A) = xv,π(A)} .
Each coalition A ∈ T π(v) is said to be tight with respect to v and pi. Note
that as a consequence of (4.3), the following inclusion holds:
Cπ ⊆ T π(v), for all v ∈ G(L) and all pi ∈ Π. (4.4)
Theorem 4.1. Let L be a finite distributive lattice and v ∈ G(L). Then the
following are equivalent:
1. v ∈ GS(L).
2. xv,π ∈ C(v), for each pi ∈ Π.
3. ext C(v) = {xv,π | pi ∈ Π}.
4. v(A) = min
π∈Π
xv,π(A), for each A ∈ L.
Proof. The equivalence of the first three items is well known; see [9, Theorem
3.27]. We show that 4. implies 2. Let σ ∈ Π. Then, for all A ∈ L,
xv,σ(A) ≥ min
π∈Π
xv,π(A) = v(A).
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By (4.3) we have xv,σ(N) = v(N).
From 2. to 4. It suffices to show that for each A ∈ L there exists pi ∈ Π
such that v(A) = xv,π(A). Clearly, we can always find a maximal chain Cπ in
L such that A ∈ Cπ for some pi ∈ Π. Then (4.3) yields v(A) = x
v,π(A).
Remark 4.1. Many other characterizations of supermodularity can be found
in the literature in case that L is a Boolean lattice. See [20, Appendix A]
for a comprehensive list of such conditions. In particular, the implication
from 2. to 1. was proved by Ichiishi in [11]. The necessary and sufficient
conditions involving specific marginal vectors can be found in [21].
Given v ∈ G(L) let xv : Π → R
n be defined by
xv(pi) := xv,π, for all pi ∈ Π.
Further, we consider a mapping x : G(L)→ (Rn)Π such that
x(v) := xv, for all v ∈ G(L).
As in [20] we call x the payoff-array transformation.
Lemma 4.1. The payoff-array transformation x is linear and injective.
Proof. Linearity is a direct consequence of the identities xv+w,π = xv,π+xw,π
and xαv,π = αxv,π, which are true for every v,w ∈ G(L), all α ∈ R and all
pi ∈ Π. Assume that v,w ∈ G(L) satisfy x
v = xw and let A ∈ L. Then
there exists a permutation pi ∈ Π such that A ∈ C
π. It follows from (4.3)
and from the assumption that
v(A) = xv,π(A) = xw,π(A) = w(A).
Hence, x is injective.
We describe the range of payoff-array transformation x on the set of 0-
normalized games. For any mapping y : Π → R
n we denote yπ := y(pi) ∈
R
n, for all pi ∈ Π.
Lemma 4.2. Let y : Π → R
n. The following are equivalent:
1. There is a unique game v ∈ G⋆(L) such that y = xv.
2. These conditions are satisfied:
yπ(A) = yσ(A) for all pi, σ ∈ Π and all A ∈ C
π ∩ Cσ, (†)
yπi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π and all i ∈ N such that ↓ i ∈ C
π. (††)
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Proof. Let y = xv for some v ∈ G⋆(L). The equality in (†) is a direct
consequence of (4.3) since, for any pi, σ ∈ Π satisfying A ∈ C
π ∩ Cσ, we get
yπ(A) = xv,π(A) = v(A) = xv,σ(A) = yσ(A).
Further, let pi ∈ Π and i ∈ N satisfy ↓ i ∈ C
π. Put A := ↓ i and observe
that A ∈ J by Proposition 2.1. This implies that the unique predecessor of
A in L is A− = A \ {i} and A− ∈ Cπ, by maximality of the chain Cπ. We
obtain
yπi = x
v,π
i = x
v,π(A)− xv,π(A−) = v(A)− v(A−) = 0,
where the third equality follows from (4.3) and the fourth one from 0-
normalization of v (Lemma 3.2).
Conversely, assume that the conditions (†)–(††) are true. If a game
v ∈ G⋆(L) satisfying y = xv exists, then it is unique by injectivity of x
(Lemma 4.1). The condition (†) guarantees that it is correct to define the
game v as
v(A) := yπ(A) for all pi ∈ Π and all A ∈ C
π. (4.5)
By the definition, y = xv.
It remains to verify that v is 0-normalized. Let A ∈ J . By Proposition
2.1 it follows that A = ↓ i for a unique i ∈ N . There exists some compatible
permutation pi satisfying A ∈ Cπ. Hence, by the definition of v and (††),
v(A)− v(A−) = yπ(A)− yπ(A−) = yπi = 0.
This means that v is 0-normalized and the proof is finished.
Remark 4.2. A mapping y : Π → R
n, whose special case is the payoff-
array transformation x, can be viewed as a finite collection of possibly re-
peating points in Rn labeled by permutations. This interpretation appears
in [3], where a map y from a finite set into Rn is termed a point configuration.
5. Main result
Denote
Nπ(v) := {i ∈ N | xv,πi = 0}.
The main theorem gives a simple criterion how to recognize extreme games
among all 0-normalized supermodular games.
Theorem 5.1. Let v ∈ G⋆S(L) be nonzero. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
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1. The game v is extreme in G⋆S(L).
2. If y : Π → R
n satisfies the conditions
yπ(A) = yσ(A) for all pi, σ ∈ Π and all A ∈ T
π(v) ∩ T σ(v), (∗)
yπi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π and all i ∈ N
π(v), (∗∗)
then y = αxv, for some α ∈ R.
We prepare a lemma to be used in the proof of Theorem 5.1. For any
v ∈ G(L), put
Fv :=
{
{A,B} ⊆ L | v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) = v(A) + v(B), A||B
}
. (5.1)
where
A||B means A 6⊆ B and B 6⊆ A.
For any point configuration y : Π → R
n and a game v ∈ G(L), we consider
the following property:
yπ(A) = yσ(A), for each {A,B} ∈ Fv and all pi, σ ∈ Π
such that A ∩B,B,A ∪B ∈ Cπ and A ∈ Cσ.
(5.2)
Lemma 5.1. Let v ∈ G⋆S(L) and let y : Π → R
n be such that (∗) and (∗∗)
are satisfied. Then y fullfills (†),(††), and (5.2).
Proof. Assume that y satisfies (∗) and (∗∗). It is easy to see that (†) and
(††) are true. In order to prove (5.2), let {A,B} ∈ Fv , pi, σ ∈ Π, and
A ∩B,B,A ∪B ∈ Cπ, A ∈ Cσ. Since
v(A) = v(A∪B)+v(A∩B)−v(B) = xv,π(A∪B)+xv,π(A∩B)−xv,π(B) = xv,π(A),
we get A ∈ T π(v). Hence, A ∈ T π(v) ∩ Cσ and (∗) says that yπ(A) =
yσ(A).
Proof. (of Theorem 5.1) Let v ∈ G⋆S(L) be nonzero. We need to show that
v is extreme if and only if the following inclusion holds true:
{y : Π → R
n | y satisfies (∗), (∗∗)} ⊆ {αxv | α ∈ R}. (5.3)
By the Minkowski-Weyl-Farkas theorem (see [1, Theorem 3.34]), v is extreme
if and only if v belongs to the one-dimensional solution space of some set of
tight inequalities for G⋆S(L) of the form w(A∪B)+w(A∩B)−w(A)−w(B) ≥
0, for all A,B ∈ L \ {∅, N}. Define
G(v) := {w ∈ G⋆(L) | w(A∪B)+w(A∩B) = w(A)+w(B), for all {A,B} ∈ Fv},
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where Fv is as in (5.1). Thus, extremality of v is equivalent to the condition
G(v) = {αv | α ∈ R}. (5.4)
Putting x(G(v)) := {xw | w ∈ G(v)} and using Lemma 4.1, it is immediate
that (5.4) holds if and only if
x(G(v)) = {αxv | α ∈ R}. (5.5)
We claim that
x(G(v)) ⊇ {y : Π→ Rn | y satisfies (†), (††), and (5.2)}. (5.6)
Let y satisfies (†), (††), and (5.2). Lemma 4.2 provides a unique w ∈ G⋆(L)
such that y = xw. We need to verify that w ∈ G(v). To this end, let
{A,B} ∈ Fv. Pick permutations pi, σ ∈ Π such that A ∩B,B,A ∪B ∈ C
π
and A ∈ Cσ. Then (5.2) shows that
w(A ∪B) + w(A ∩B)− w(B) = yπ(A) = yσ(A) = w(A).
Hence, w ∈ G(v). Finally, from (5.5), (5.6), and Lemma 5.1 we get (5.3),
and the proof is finished.
We will apply Theorem 5.1 to the cone of supermodular games on the
distributive lattice L from Example 2.1. The computations were carried out
in the package Convex for Maple [6].
Example 5.1. The cone G⋆S(L) is embedded into R
9 and its dimension is 5.
It has 6 extreme rays. We will enumerate their minimal integer generators.
The parentheses and commas are omitted for the sake of brevity in what
follows. Whenever vi(A) is missing, we put vi(A) := 0.
• v1(24) = v1(234) = v1(N) = 1.
• v2(34) = v2(234) = v2(N) = 1.
• v3(23) = v3(123) = v3(234) = v3(N) = 1.
• v4(234) = v4(N) = 1.
• v5(23) = v5(24) = v5(34) = v5(123) = 1, v5(234) = v5(N) = 2.
• v6(N) = 1.
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We will check that v1 is extreme using Theorem 5.1. Since there are 8 max-
imal chains in L, there are 8 compatible permutations: pi1 = (2314), pi2 =
(2341), pi3 = (2431), pi4 = (3241), pi5 = (3241), pi6 = (3421), pi7 = (4231),
and pi8 = (4321). Let I1 := {1, . . . , 5} and I2 := {6, 7, 8}. There are only
2 marginal vectors associated with v1,
xv1,πi =
{
(0, 0, 0, 1) i ∈ I1,
(0, 1, 0, 0) i ∈ I2.
This means that the tight sets are
T πi(v1) =
{
{∅, 2, 3, 23, 24, 123, 234, N} i ∈ I1,
{∅, 3, 4, 24, 34, 234, N} i ∈ I2.
Hence, the conditions (∗) and (∗∗) for y : Π → R
4 are in the form of linear
equalities, for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2:
yπi1 = y
πi
2 = y
πi
3 = 0 (5.7)
y
πj
1 = y
πj
3 = y
πj
4 = 0 (5.8)
yπi3 = y
πj
3 (5.9)
yπi2 + y
πi
4 = y
πj
2 + y
πj
4 (5.10)
yπi2 + y
πi
3 + y
πi
4 = y
πj
2 + y
πj
3 + y
πj
4 (5.11)
yπi1 + y
πi
2 + y
πi
3 + y
πi
4 = y
πj
1 + y
πj
2 + y
πj
3 + y
πj
4 (5.12)
The linear system above has a unique solution up to a real multiple. Observe
that yπi4 = y
πj
2 , for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2, as a consequence of (5.7), (5.8),
and (5.10). Let α ∈ R. Then necessarily y = αxv1 . Thus, v1 is extreme by
Theorem 5.1.
Remark 5.1. It is natural to ask for a game-theoretic meaning of the ex-
treme supermodular games. Since the supermodular cone is finitely-generated,
every supermodular game is a conic combination of the extreme ones. There
are important solution concepts [13], such as the core or Shapley value, which
are linear maps on the supermodular cone. Hence, such solution concepts
preserve every conic combination of supermodular games. From this view-
point, extreme supermodular games play the role of basic building block
since they fully determine values of any linear solution concept on the su-
permodular cone.
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6. Faces and core structure
Let Φ(GS(L)) be the face lattice of GS(L), that is, the family of all
nonempty faces of GS(L) ordered by inclusion ⊆. In what follows we will
describe the structure of this face lattice. For any subset G ⊆ GS(L) we
define
[G] :=
⋂
{F ∈ Φ(GS(L)) | F ⊇ G},
the smallest face containing G. Join ∨ and meet ∧ in Φ(GS(L)) are com-
puted as
F ⊔G = [F ∪G] and F ⊓G = F ∩G, for all F,G ∈ Φ(GS(L)).
For any face F , let relintF be the relative interior of F . Put Φ′(GS(L)) =
{relintF | F ∈ Φ(GS(L))}. Then Φ
′(GS(L)) is a lattice isomorphic to
Φ(GS(L)) in which the top is relintGS(L), the bottom is ∅, and the join
and the meet are given by
relintF ∨ relintG = relint(F ⊔G),
relintF ∧ relintG = relint(F ⊓G).
The following lemma describes the relation between tight sets of v ∈ GS(L)
and faces of GS(L).
Lemma 6.1. Let v ∈ GS(L). The following holds.
1. Let pi ∈ Π and A,B ∈ T
π(v), A||B. Then {A,B} ∈ Fv.
2. Let {A,B} ∈ Fv and pi ∈ Π such that B,A ∪ B,A ∩ B ∈ C
π. Then
A ∈ T π(v) \ Cπ.
Proof. 1. Let v ∈ GS(L), pi ∈ Π, and A,B ∈ T
π(v) with A||B. It is well
known that T π(v) is closed under union and intersection for supermodular
games. Hence, the equality xv,π(A) + xv,π(B) = xv,π(A ∪ B) + xv,π(A ∩ B)
yields v(A) + v(B) = v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B). Therefore, {A,B} ∈ Fv .
2. Let {A,B} ∈ Fv and let pi ∈ Π be such that B,A ∪ B,A ∩B ∈ C
π.
Then
v(A) = v(A∪B)+v(A∩B)−v(B) = xv,π(A∪B)+xv,π(A∩B)−xv,π(B) = xv,π(A).
Since A||B, we get A ∈ T π(v) \ Cπ.
Games in GS(L) belong to the same face if and only if they possess
identical structure of their tight sets. Precisely:
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Proposition 6.1. Let v,w ∈ GS(L). The following are equivalent.
1. v,w ∈ relintF , for some F ∈ Φ(GS(L)).
2. T π(v) = T π(w), for every pi ∈ Π.
Proof. Let v,w ∈ relintF for some F ∈ Φ(GS(L)). If they are linearly
dependent, then the statement is trivial. Assume that v and w are linearly
independent and let L be the unique line in the linear space G(L) such
that v,w ∈ L. Then L ∩ (F \ relintF ) = {u, u′}, where u 6= u′. Since
v,w ∈ relintF there exist 0 < α, β < 1 such that v = αu + (1 − α)u′ and
w = βu+ (1− β)u′.
Let pi ∈ Π and A ∈ T
π(v). By linearity (Lemma 4.1) we get
αxu,π(A) + (1− α)xu
′,π(A) = xv,π(A) = v(A) = αu(A) + (1− α)u′(A).
Since xu,π ∈ C(u) and xu
′,π ∈ C(u′), this implies xu,π(A) = u(A) and
xu
′,π(A) = u′(A), which means that A ∈ T π(u) ∩ T π(u′). Hence,
w(A) = βu(A) + (1− β)u′(A) = βxu,π(A) + (1− β)xu
′,π(A) = xw,π(A).
This proves the inclusion T π(v) ⊆ T π(w). The opposite inclusion is estab-
lished analogously.
To prove the converse, assume T π(v) = T π(w) for all pi ∈ Π. It suffices
to show that Fv = Fw, where Fv is as in (5.1), since this already implies
existence of a unique F ∈ Φ(GS(L)) such that v,w ∈ relintF . First, we
prove
Fv ⊆ Fw. (6.1)
Let {A,B} ∈ Fv. There exists pi ∈ Π such that A ∩ B,A,A ∪ B ∈ C
π.
Hence, A ∈ T π(v) and
v(B) = v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B)− v(A)
= xv,π(A ∪B) + xv,π(A ∩B)− xv,π(A) = xv,π(B),
which means B ∈ T π(v) = T π(w). Then A,B ∈ T π(w), and by Lemma
6.1 (1) {A,B} ∈ Fw, so (6.1) holds. The proof of inclusion Fw ⊆ Fv is
analogous.
Let S(L) be the lattice of all sublattices of L ordered by set inclusion ⊆.
The core structure of v ∈ GS(L) (cf. [12] and [20, Definition 4]) is the
mapping T (v) : Π → S(L) defined as
pi ∈ Π 7→ T
π(v).
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The above definition is correct since T π(v) is a lattice as a consequence of
Lemma 6.1. By Proposition 6.1, T (v) = T (w) for all v,w ∈ relintF . Hence,
we may define a mapping
T : Φ(GS(L))→ S(L)
Π
by
T (F ) := T (v), for any v ∈ relintF .
We will order the elements of S(L)Π by the product order ⊆ inherited from
S(L). Specifically, for any U ,V ∈ S(L)Π ,
U ⊆ V whenever Uπ ⊆ Vπ, for all pi ∈ Π.
Proposition 6.2. The mapping T is injective, order-reversing, and its in-
verse T −1 is also order-reversing.
Proof. T injective is an easy consequence of Proposition 6.1. We will prove
that T is an order-reversing map. Let F1 ⊆ F2 be faces of GS(L) and select
arbitrarily v1 ∈ relintF1 and v2 ∈ relintF2. We want to show
T π(v2) ⊆ T
π(v1) for every pi ∈ Π. (6.2)
Let pi ∈ Π and A ∈ T
π(v2). Using (4.1), this is equivalent to saying that
v2 is a solution of the equation in v:∑
i∈A
(v(Aππ−1(i))− v(A
π
π−1(i−1))) = v(A). (6.3)
As this equation is satisfied by all games in relintF2 and only these ones,
it follows that (6.3) is implied by the equalities determining relintF2, that
is, those corresponding to Fv2 . As F1 ⊆ F2, relintF1 is determined by
a superset of equalities, and therefore the equality (6.3) is also satisfied by
v1. Hence A ∈ T π(v1).
To show that T −1 is order-reversing, let T π(v1) ⊆ T
π(v2) for all pi ∈ Π,
where v1 ∈ relintF1 and v2 ∈ relintF2, for some faces F1 and F2. We will
prove that F2 ⊆ F1, which is the same as Fv1 ⊆ Fv2 . Let {A,B} ∈ Fv1 .
Then there exists pi s.t. A ∩ B,A,A ∪ B ∈ Cπ. Hence, by Lemma 6.1 (2),
B ∈ T π(v1) \ C
π, hence B ∈ T π(v2) \ C
π. As A ∈ Cπ ⊆ T π(v2) and A‖B, by
Lemma 6.1 (1), {A,B} ∈ Fv2 .
Corollary 6.1. T is a lattice isomorphism from the face lattice Φ(GS(L))
onto a sublattice of S(L)Π.
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Remark 6.1. The same reasoning can be applied to the face lattice of all
0-normalized supermodular games, Φ(G⋆S(L)). Indeed, it follows from the
direct sum decomposition (3.3) that Φ(G⋆S(L)) and Φ(GS(L)) are isomorphic
lattices.
7. Facets of the cone of supermodular games
Kuipers et al. [12, Corollary 11] characterised those supermodular in-
equalities which determine the facets of GS(L) when L = 2
N . Specifically,
the facet-determining inequalities are
v(A ∪ {i, j}) − v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A ∪ {j}) + v(A) ≥ 0 (7.1)
for all A ⊆ N and every pair of distinct i, j ∈ N \ A. The next theorem
identifies the facets of the cone GS(L), for any L. Since L is the lattice of
down-sets of a poset (N,), if A ∈ L and i ∈ N are such that ⇓ i ⊆ A, then
A ∪ {i} ∈ L.
Theorem 7.1. The facets of GS(L) are given by the inequalities of the form
v(A ∪ {i, j}) − v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A ∪ {j}) + v(A) ≥ 0 (7.2)
with A ∈ L and distinct i, j ∈ N \A such that ⇓ i ⊆ A and ⇓ j ⊆ A.
Proof. Observe that, since the lattice L is ranked1, if A and A ∪ B with
B ⊆ N \ A are in L, then A ∪ {i} ∈ L for some i ∈ B.
First, we show that any supermodular inequality can be derived from
those of type (7.2). Consider
v(A ∪B)− v(A)− v(B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ 0, (A,B ∈ L) (7.3)
with |A∆B| > 2. We show by induction on |A∆B| that (7.3) can be derived
from (7.2). First we establish the result for |A∆B| = 3. Take
v(A ∪ {i, j, k}) − v(A ∪ {i, j}) − v(A ∪ {k}) + v(A) ≥ 0, (7.4)
with A∪{i, j}), A∪{k} ∈ L. SupposingA′ := A∪{i} ∈ L (by the preliminary
remark, either A∪ {i} or A∪ {j} belongs to L), we have by the assumption
v(A′ ∪ {j, k}) − v(A′ ∪ {j}) − v(A′ ∪ {k}) + v(A′) ≥ 0,
v(A ∪ {i, k}) − v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A ∪ {k}) + v(A) ≥ 0,
1A ranked (also graded) lattice is a lattice in which all the maximal chains have the
same cardinality.
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whose sum yields (7.4).
We suppose that the result holds for |A∆B| = k, where k ≥ 3, and let
us prove it for |A∆B| = k + 1. Consider the inequality
v(A∪{i1, . . . , iℓ, . . . , ik+1})−v(A∪{i1, . . . , iℓ})−v(A∪{iℓ+1, . . . , ik+1})+v(A) ≥ 0,
(7.5)
with A ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ}, A ∪ {iℓ+1, . . . , ik+1} ∈ L. Put A
′ := A ∪ {iℓ+1} ∈ L. It
follows from the assumption that
v(A′ ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ, iℓ+2, . . . , ik+1})− v(A
′ ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ})− v(A
′ ∪ {iℓ+2, . . . , ik+1}) + v(A
′) ≥ 0
v(A ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ+1})− v(A ∪ {iℓ+1})− v(A ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ}) + v(A) ≥ 0,
whose sum gives (7.5).
Second, we prove that no inequality of type (7.2) is redundant. It is
clearly sufficient to prove the result for the Boolean lattice L = 2N . Consider
(7.2) for fixed A, i, j and define the following game vA,i,j for an arbitrary
ε > 0:
vA,i,j(B) :=


ε if B = A ∪ {i},
0 if B ⊂ A ∪ {i} or B = A ∪ {j} or B ⊃ A ∪ {i},
−ε otherwise.
We claim that vA,i,j satisfies all the inequalities (7.2) except the one with
A, i, j. This proves that the latter inequality is not redundant.
Proof of the claim. Put v := vA,i,j, i := 1, j := 2. Clearly,
v(A ∪ {1, 2}) − v(A ∪ {1}) − v(A ∪ {2}) + v(A) = −ε < 0.
Consider the quantity
∆(B, i, j) := v(B ∪ {i, j}) − v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B ∪ {j}) + v(B).
We first study ∆(B, i, j) when one of the terms has value ε. If v(B∪{i, j}) =
ε or v(B) = ε, the other terms can be 0 or −ε, so that ∆(B, i, j) ≥ 0. If
v(B ∪ {i}) = ε (i.e., B = A, i = 1), then v(B ∪ {j}) = −ε, unless j = 2.
Supposing this is not the case, we have then v(B∪{i, j}) = v(B) = 0. Hence,
∆(B, i, j) = 0.
We study now ∆(B, i, j) when the values of the terms are either 0 or −ε.
Suppose that v(B∪{i}) = v(B∪{j}) = 0. Both B∪{i} and B∪{j} are either
proper subsets of A∪{1} or proper supersets of it. Then bothB andB∪{i, j}
are either subsets or supersets of A ∪ {1}, and the equality is impossible
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since we excluded the value ε for v. Therefore, v(B∪{i, j}) = v(B) = 0, and
∆(B, i, j) = 0. Suppose now that v(B∪{i}) = 0 and v(B∪{j}) = −ε. Then
either B∪{i} ⊂ A∪{1} or B∪{i} ⊃ A∪{1}, and in both cases j 6∈ A∪{1}.
It follows that, if B ∪ {i} ⊂ A ∪ {1}, then B ⊂ A ∪ {1}, therefore v(B) = 0,
yielding ∆(B, i, j) ≥ 0. If B ∪ {i} ⊃ A ∪ {1}, then v(B ∪ {i, j}) = 0, hence
the same conclusion holds. Finally, suppose v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B ∪ {j}) = −ε.
Then, in any case, ∆(B, i, j) ≥ 0.
Example 7.1. Let (N,) and L be as in Example 2.1. Applying Theorem
7.1 we see that the facets ofGS(L) are in bijection with the linear inequalities
of the form
1. v({i, j}) ≥ v({i}) + v({j}), for all distinct i, j ∈ N \ {1},
2. v(A∪B)+v(A∩B) ≥ v(A)+v(B), for all distinct A,B ∈ L satisfying
|A| = |B| = 2,
3. v(N) + v({2, 3}) ≥ v({1, 2, 3}) + v({2, 3, 4}).
Thus, there are 7 facets, whereas the cone GS(2
N ) of supermodular games
on the Boolean lattice 2N has
(
n
2
)
· 2n−2 = 24 facets by (7.1).
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